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LAW REFORM NEEDS REFORM
By J. N. LYON*
There is a tide in the affairs of men,
Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune;
Omitted, all the voyage of their life
Is bound in shallows and in miseries.
On such a full sea we are now afloat,
And we must take the current when it serves,
Or lose our ventures.
Julius Ceasar, Act IV, Scene III.
INTRODUCTION
The process of law reform needs to be given a broader conception if
the public is to derive much benefit from the substantial amounts of public
money being spent on law reform in Canada. Perhaps the best clue as to
why we have not created an imaginative and dynamic law reform movement
is found in the fact that our provincial law reform statutes tend to look like
carbon copies of the English Law Commissions Act.'
As a result, we have not defined clearly the objectives of law reform,
nor considered which are the most urgent problems, in what order of priority
we should go at them, what resources are available to us for the task, and
what alternative strategies are likely to achieve the most, given the resources
and the realities we must deal with.
The law reform model that has developed in Canada is a direct product
of our legal training. Lawyers are not trained to think in terms of the rational
allocation of resources through selected strategies designed to achieve
optimum results in terms of defined objectives. We are trained to follow
precedent and established procedures, whatever the results. Consequences
are the responsibility of someone else, usually the legislatures, in the dominant
conception of the lawyer and his public responsibility. When law reform is
forced into the conventional mold of legal thinking it becomes cut off from
the valuable experience and techniques of other disciplines. We must find
better ways.
This is not an attempt to condemn law reform to date as a failure. Much
excellent work has been done by judges, practising lawyers and legal scholars.
One need only cite the monumental McRuer Report on civil rights in On-
tario, 2 Reid's Administrative Law and Practice,3 and Cumming and Micken-
* Mr. Lyon is a Professor of Law at McGill University.
'13 & 14 ElizIc. 22 (1965).
2 Ont. Royal Commission Inquiry into Civil Rights (Toronto: Queen's Printer,
1968-1971).
3 Robert F. Reid, Administrative Law and Practice (Toronto: Butterworths, 1971).
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berg's Native Rights in Canada4 to show that we are moving. But these are
all at the level of scholarly treatment of problems. What is so lacking is the
translation of such documents into results at the operational level of the legal
order, and our lack of capacity for this part of the reform process may lead
us to deflect all our resources into the writing of reports. We are expert at
solving problems of the legal order in words, but rather inept at effecting
real improvements at the human level.
The purpose of this study is to suggest how we might improve our
performance in achieving reform at the operational level. It is based largely
on the writer's experience of one year as the fulltime member of the Law
Reform Commission of British Columbia.
1. What is Law Reform?
If law reform is to become measurable in terms of actual results and
not just written reports, it must be concerned with the whole of legal pro-
cess and not just written laws. I suggest that legal process consists of three
main elements:
1) the written body of laws,
2) lawyers, taken in the broadest sense to include judges, practitioners
and academics, and
3) legal institutions.
Why has law reform to date been defined almost exclusively in terms of
revision of written laws, the first of the three categories above? The main
reason seems to be the creation of specialized agencies like law reform com-
missions, whose personnel have simply proceeded with reform of written law
because that is consistent with their training and experience and that is what
the law reform statutes seem to contemplate. If this is the appropriate ap-
proach for such bodies, then there must be some other agency to clarify and
coordinate the larger process of reform of the whole legal order (law, lawyers,
and legal institutions) of which the written law is but a part. But even if such
agencies existed, I suggest that law reform commissions should set per-
formance standards for themselves in terms of results at the operational
level, not just in terms of published reports, and to monitor their own per-
formance continually in terms of those standards. The research function
which now dominates the work of law reform commissions would become
but one of the important functions of commissions. Such a shift in the ap-
proach to assessing performance would change dramatically our conception
of law reform as a process and some rather different skills and experience
would become necessary in law reform personnel, in addition to the basic
legal skills and experience that will always be necessary.
This is the point at which many will question my thesis. Surely, they
will say, the job of a law reform commission is to recommend changes after
full study. Responsibility thereafter lies with the government and legislature.
4Peter A. Cumming and Neil H. Mickenberg, Native Rights in Canada (2nd ed)
Toronto: Indian-Eskimo Assoc. of Canada, 1972).
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My point is that this is only one way of looking at the matter and I am sug-
gesting that experience has shown it to be an inadequate basis for construct-
ing a model of law reform. Failure to solve real problems is always the fault
of some other agency because the law reform agency is seen as having suc-
cessfully fulfilled its responsibility with the publication of a report that
passes academic muster.
It is obvious that much reform activity can and must be initiated and
carried out within the legal order quite apart from specialized law reform
agencies, whose function as presently conceived is narrow and limited. In-
deed, in a perfect legal order there would be no need for a law reform agency
because those in responsible positions, from attorney-general and chief
justice to court clerks, would remove imperfections, faults or errors as they
appeared. Sound administration combined with effective leadership are the
basic ingredients of ongoing reform, and we would do well to keep this fact
in mind lest we look too much to specialized agencies to bear the respon-
sibilities of elected and appointed public leaders.
There is no substitute for sound administration, and if basic housekeep-
ing is neglected in the legal order there will be a demand that scarce and
valuable resources of specialized agencies be diverted into an attempt to over-
come such neglect. If we are to avoid this kind of waste, we must begin
with two basic tasks:
1) developing a full descriptive model of the process of law reform that
includes objectives, strategies, resources, and the full range of par-
ticipants, building into the model performance criteria in terms of
actual results at the operational level;
2) defining the responsibilities of each of the participants in the process.
Before we can develop an adequate conception of law reform, we must
turn to the most basic question of jurisprudence: what is the nature and pur-
pose of law? In general terms, law is the ordering force that maintains a
community in which security and freedom are balanced in order to secure
and promote a high quality of life in a stable, continuing society. Law is a
dynamic process, constantly adjusting to changing circumstances, so that
there is no clear, fixed set of criteria for measuring its performance. Never-
theless, some standards must be identified and made as clear as possible if
law is to serve human ends. The balance between security and freedom in
any community depends upon the basic value preferences of that community
as expressed in its constitution. Freedom can be traded for security and
security can be traded for freedom, but over the long term a lack of balance
in either direction is likely to undermine community itself.
A general statement of the basic value preferences of the Canadian
people might be found in the preamble and section 1 of the Canadian Bill
of Rights: 5
"The Parliament of Canada, affirming that the Canadian Nation is
founded upon principles that acknowledge the supremacy of God, the dignity
5 S.C. 1960 c. 44. Also reprinted in R.S.C. 1970 Appendix Ill.
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and worth of the human person and the position of the family in a society
of free men and free institutions;
Affirming also that men and institutions remain free only when freedom
is founded upon respect for moral and spiritual values and the rule of law;
And being desirous of enshrining these principles and the human rights
and fundamental freedoms derived from them, in a Bill of Rights which
shall reflect the respect of Parliament for its constitutional authority and
which shall ensure the protection of these rights and freedoms in Canada:
THEREFORE Her Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate and House of Commons of Canada, enacts as follows:
PART I
Bill of Rights.
1. It is hereby recognized and declared that in Canada there have
existed and shall continue to exist without discrimination by reason of race,
national origin, colour, religion or sex, the following human rights and
fundamental freedoms, namely,
(a) the right of the individual to life, liberty, security of the person
and enjoyment of property, and the right not to be deprived thereof
except by due process of law;
(b) the right of the individual to equality before the law and the pro-
tection of the law;
(c) freedom of religion;
(d) freedom of speech;
(e) freedom of assembly and association; and
(f) freedom of the press."
Because of these provisions, it may no longer be necessary to debate
about the basic value preferences of our legal order. They may thus have
been authoritatively described by the Parliament of Canada. The fact that
the Canadian Bill of Rights was not incorporated into the Revised statutes
of Canada of 1970 but rather left as a public statute of 1960 indicates a
recognition by Parliament itself of the special character of the Bill of Rights.
The real debate may therefore be about the best ways to give those value
preferences expression in the daily life of the country. One of the best ways
could be to persuade every person in public office, whether federal or pro-
vincial, to take the Bill of Rights seriously and to check every proposed
decision or action to ensure it will not violate either the spirit or the letter
of the Bill. While the Bill may not provide answers to hard questions in-
volving the balancing of one right or freedom against another, it does provide
broad guidance to decision and action, and legislators, judges and govern-
ment officers alike should be persuaded to consider undergoing a conscious
process of building the values of the Bill of Rights into their thinking
processes.
The Bill of Rights confers on the courts a great opportunity for effective
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law reform through judicial decision. The preamble to the Bill recites the
desire of Parliament that the Bill shall ensure the protection of the rights
and freedoms therein declared, and section I gives courts of law a general
authority very similar to the jurisdiction in equity which our judges have
long exercised. This does not mean that courts of law are expected to create
independent legal rights out of the Bill. That is for the legislatures. What
the courts can and should do, however, is develop the general terms of the
Bill into a coherent and philosophically consistent framework of interpreta-
tion for laws of Canada. The courts should not wait for Parliament to pro-
vide full particulars of each declared right and freedom, for that is pre-
cisely the function Parliament has conferred on the courts.
From this excursion into the Canadian Bill of Rights, a basic source
of guidance for law reform in Canada, we can describe a general model of
law reform. Law reform is the process of identifying and clarifying standards
of performance for the legal order and of finding and implementing ways of
optimizing achievement of those standards. Any person who is in a position
to do these things can be a participant in the process of law reform. While
special resources may be necessary for particular reform activities, the one
essential ingredient is the will to make the legal order work more effectively.
This requires a commitment to values such as those set out in section 1 of the
Canadian Bill of Rights, and it requires initiative.
If this model is to develop into a working model, our primary emphasis
must shift from institutions to functions. We have a fixation with formal
authority and visible institutions. We neglect the informal network of action
and change that is a nice blend of personal commitment, formal authority
and a sense of the dynamics of the situation at any given time and place.
It is this larger, informal, network that generates significant reform. Formal
institutions are merely vehicles through which the reform activities are
channeled.
In this perspective, law reform becomes as much a state of mind as a
process, and participation is open to virtually all those who work within the
legal order, if they want it. Furthermore, participation is required of those who
occupy key positions in the legal order, such as attorneys-general, chief
judges, benchers, and legal academics, whether they want it or not, and no
amount of reform activity by specialized agencies will overcome a failure on
the part of these key participants to take up the challenge of reform.
2. A Critique of the Law Reform Movement in Canada
In a situation where many of our problems stem from organizational
and mental rigidities, one would expect to find, as the fundamental principle
of reform, an unstructured network of functional activities built around the
best available minds, supported by flexible administrative services manned by
result-oriented "doers" operating free of hierarchical principles and bureau-
cratic restraints.
Unfortunately, this is not generally the case. Law reform has largely
become an industry, in which academics are contracted to man the assembly
line from which emerges the stereotyped "report" which justifies the agency's
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existence. The explanation of why this has happened is very simple: nobody
sat down to think through the process of law reform and to design a model
for the purpose. In Canada we simply copied the English model and then set
up research institutions to carry on the same kind of word processes as have
apparently proved a failure in England. The Law Reform Commission of
Canada should be excepted from this comment, but it remains to be seen
whether that Commission will succeed in designing and implementing an
effective model of law reform. The appointment of an experienced sociologist
as a full-time member of the Commission is perhaps the most hopeful sign
in the field of law reform in Canada to date.
Another costly error in the development of law reform in Canada has
been our commitment to the myth of the expert. One can simply challenge
as nonsense the notion that law professors, superior court judges and senior
lawyers are expert in matters of law reform. No one would question their
expertise in legal doctrine and analytical and research skills, but this relates
to just one part of legal process, so that to force all reform activities into a
model designed by this group of experts is to ensure failure by neglecting
systematic development and treatment of the rest of the process.
It is an interesting fact that it seems never to have occurred to a law
reform commission in Canada that it might exert its influence in some
systematic manner other than through written reports. Lawyers are
fascinated by words, and are long conditioned to believe that the world
began with an Act of Parliament. A written report is an attempt to capture
in a word picture a segment of life. The written report has its uses and at
times is indispensable, but to try to reform a legal order entirely through
written reports, many of them prepared by persons with little or no experi-
ence in the dynamics of bringing words to bear on the real world, is folly.
We have developed no system for tapping the tremendous pool of ex-
perience and energy that exists within the legal system. There are people
in the system whose experience and judgment tells them what needs to be
done. They do not need the report of an expert to tell them what is wrong
and how to go about improving things, nor do they always have the time to
record their experience and conclusions in writing. Yet we stifle this potential
by superimposing the myth of the expert, telling these people, in effect, that
their working experience and judgment are not enough to qualify them for
the reform process.
The truth is that there are no experts when it comes to reform. There
are various complementary skills and experience that are necessary to the
reform process, and the important question is how and where we should fuse
them in order to get the best return in actual results. So far our answer has
been almost exclusively in an organization like a law reform commission. It
is suggested that a major alternative lies in the concept of working or opera-
tional reform, in which the flow of experience and skills is reversed and
reform projects are located right within the legal system, to be pursued
through action rather than words.
One great advantage of this proposed approach is that it virtually en-
sures consultation with those affected by the legal system, since operational
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personnel are in daily contact with those people. We have entered the age
of public consultation by government, but too often form triumphs over
substance, resulting in various forms of pseudo-democracy such as "hot line"
appearances by members of government and other forms of political grand-
standing. Real consultation takes place in the context of real problems and
is done by experienced personnel who understand the problems. Effective
public leaders reach the public through the most effective people who work
under them, and in the administration of justice this route begins with the
ordinary judge, administrator, counsel or clerk who spends his days on the
firing line of the legal system.
Law and Policy
An important consideration which must be recognized as underlying
the existing model of law reform is the attempt to concentrate the process on
matters of a "legal" character, which therefore call for the concentrated
application of legal expertise. Other matters are usually described as matters
of "policy" about which lawyers have no claim to expertise and which
should not, therefore, be studied or commented on by law reform com-
missions. If such commissions did concern themselves with such matters, it
is thought, they would be trespassing on the exclusive domain of the executive
and legislative branches of government.
While this proposition does contain a valid concern, I suggest that the
problem is not as simple as it is thought to be, so that the law-versus-policy
dichotomy does not lead to a satisfactory definition of law reform. What has
happened is that the narrow and specialized conception of law that is quite
properly imposed on lawyers for purposes of judicial decision and its at-
tendant counsel function, based on the theory of positive law, has been
applied in law reform to the larger legal process that is an integral part of
the whole system of government. Legal process in this larger sense is, unlike
judicial decision, loaded with policy matters, and they are matters on which
the experience of lawyers is vital to good government and effective reform.
In any case, one could easily demonstrate that almost every law reform
commission report ever published has at its heart the recommendation of one
policy in preference to another, the legal research function having served to
identify the key policy questions, to show which of the alternative policies
is presently expressed in the law, and how well it is working. The key func-
tion of the commission is to recommend one policy over another or to
indicate the relative merits of feasible alternatives, and to defend its recom-
mendations. As long as the final choice remains with governments and
legislatures, it is inaccurate to assert that commissions trespass or usurp
when they consider policy matters.
Perhaps the real concern is that the legal resources of a commission
are best used by being directed into areas where the problems involve a
maximum of law and a minimum of policy. This is no doubt true as long
as law reform commissions are constituted and function as they do, but it
begs the more basic question of what the role of such bodies ought to be.
Here we encounter the question of priorities, and we may have crippled the
law reform movement by entering it backwards. We have set up commissions
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in a particular pattern, using legal personnel and procedures, and having done
that we find ourselves defining their functions and ordering their priorities in
response to these organizational factors rather than the real problems of the
legal order. The role so defined may condemn law reform commissions to
work the sterile fields of legal doctrine, bringing forth mice after monumental
efforts, while the more serious problems of the legal order go unattended and
become more serious. The most important policy decision in law reform
is the choice of matters for study and the approach to be taken to each.
These choices, I suggest, are today made more in response to lawyers' dis-
satisfaction with the law and its processes than to the injustices felt by
citizens, and the two are far from coincidental. Indeed, some of our more
serious failures result from the conception many lawyers have of themselves
and of their professional responsibility. As long as these matters are left to
lawyers they are unlikely to change.
If the law-versus-policy distinction is to continue as the basis for defining
the role and ordering the priorities of law reform agencies, then we should
recognize that those agencies are specialized legal research bodies, concerned
with only one part of the legal order - written law - and we must decide
where the real center of gravity of the law reform movement is going to
reside and how to plug this one satellite, the law reform commission, into
the larger network of reform of law, lawyers, and legal institutions.
The Need for Facts
Lawyers pride themselves in their respect for facts and in their special
skills at finding, assembling and presenting facts before tribunals. Yet we
have no base of judicial statistics in Canada on which to base assessments of
the performance of the legal system. Our factual orientation and skills seem
to be directed at particular controversies rather than functioning systems.
Until we develop a reliable base of facts about what is going on in the
courts and in the rest of the legal order we must rely on the educated guesses
of experienced people. Sometimes these are as good as statistics, and some-
times they are even better, where both facts and their interpretation are
needed. But we require solid statistics before we can make an over-all
assessment of how the machinery of justice is functioning.
On this score, Diogenes asserted that the greatest good is knowledge,
the greatest evil ignorance. We tend to live in ignorance of the human con-
sequences of what the law does, substituting myth for what is often un-
pleasant fact. More recently, Gunnar Myrdal has given this explanation of
our resistance to knowledge:
The hypothesis is that we almost never face a random lack of knowledge.
Ignorance, like knowledge, is purposefully directed. An emotional load of
valuation conflicts presses for rationalization, creating blindness at some spots,
stimulating an urge for knowledge at others, and, in general, causing conceptions
of reality to deviate from truth in determined directions.0
Translated into law reform terms, this suggests that lawyers share a
o Objectivity in Social Research (New York: Pantheon Books, 1969) at 29.
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need to believe that the legal order is functioning fairly well, and that if
there are injustices in the community they exist in spite of the great beauty
and symmetry of the law and are attributable to someone other than lawyers.
This need shows itself in a general ignorance of, or callousness to, the many
injustices we live with daily, and a general retreat into the clean world of
corporate law practice, conveyancing, and superior court counsel work,
where the lawyer will not be upset by continuous exposure to the things the
law in fact does to people, which are there to be seen every day in the
criminal, family, and small claims divisions of those courts that constitute
the backbone of our judicial system and which are generally known among
lawyers as "inferior courts."
3. Elements of Law Reform
If law reform is to be viewed as a process, what are the elements of that
process? The descriptive model offered earlier is as follows:
Law reform is the process of identifying and clarifying standards of performance
for the legal order and of finding and implementing ways of maximizing achieve-
ment of those standards.
The elaboration of this model should not lead to a stereotype but should
rather seek to comprehend all direct participants who share common goals
of performance for the legal system, whether they are part of formal law
reform machinery or not. Only by a broad conception of this kind can we
bring to bear the best resources available and develop a sufficient variety
of strategies to deal with the many "people" problems and "systems" failures
that create injustices. The exercise will be sterile, however, unless we are
prepared to measure performance of both the legal system and the reform
process in terms of the full range of actual effects on people, using as criteria
the fundamental values of our constitutional heritage, such as those which
have been given authoritative expression in the Canadian Bill of Rights.
This is an awesome challenge, and it would be folly to attempt elabora-
tion of the proposed model of law reform in a static word picture. Ongoing
consultation and collaboration are needed if the process is to respond to the
dynamics of living law. However, the development of a working model by
those in positions to do it may be aided by the identification of some major
dimensions of the process.
Priorities
What are priorities? In a world where time and resources are never
unlimited, choices must be made between competing claims for attention.
Such choices are conditioned by a system of values, and it is as good a
measure as any of the integrity and effectiveness of public leadership to
examine the extent to which the values applied are the long-term, stable
values of the community as articulated in authoritative constitutional sources
such as the Canadian Bill of Rights.
"Limited resources", as used here, is not the same thing as "insufficient
funds." Indeed, it is possible to cripple a law reform agency by giving it too
much money, thus inflicting on it the inevitable demand for an organization
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and visible activity, foreclosing any real possibility of engaging in the pro-
cesses of inquiry, consultation, reflection and experiment that tap the real
resources of law reform: competent and experienced people committed to
operational results.
In examining how priorities are set for the limited resources available
for law reform, it is revealing to ask who sets them. The answer is lawyers,
almost without exception, and as if this is not distorting enough of the
reform process, one must add that this is a group whose mental set includes
a strong conditioned attitude of eschewing any matter that is controversial
and raises strong value conflicts in the community. These matters are
designated as "policy" matters, not appropriate for "legal" treatment. Law-
yers' concern is with "law" and "legal" matters. They do not take positions
on fundamental value questions. They do not speculate. They apply expertise
in an objective area of decision where logic applied to settled doctrine
produces legal answers.
It should come as no surprise, then, that the process of law reform
tends to be an exercise in replacing existing words with more or different
words. The dynamics of legal process gain accidental entry at best to a
model of law reform designed with the analytical tools fashioned for judicial
decision-making.
Certainly no one would advocate public opinion polls to determine
which laws should be reformed. But laws and legal problems do not exist in a
vacuum; they are reflections of community values and objectives and of social
problems respectively. By inquiring where the values of the community and
of its members are being damaged most one might proceed to identify the
causes of harm and to determine whether the application of public resources,
directly or indirectly, would alleviate the problem. Since this broad descrip-
tion probably covers the legislative domain, the focus of law reform as a
special process should be limited to law, lawyers, and legal institutions, but
viewed always in the larger context of public decision-making of which they
form integral parts. This means a middle position between the two extremes
of obsession with statutes and legal doctrine on the one hand, and a too-
broad concern with social policies and priorities that would make a super-
legislature of a law reform commission on the other.
It is the capacity to see legal process as an integral part of the whole
process of government founded on the Constitution that is so lacking in
law reform today, resulting in a curious belief that the failures and de-
ficiencies of the legal system can be understood and attacked in isolation.
Social processes are subtle and complex. A large measure of intellectual
security rewards the choice of technical areas of legal doctrine as the prime
targets for reform. But accountability for these choices must be defined in
terms of the impact on the community and its members resulting from the
resources allocated to reform. It would be hard to imagine a less responsive
measure than the currently fashionable lists of published reports. It is no
answer to assert that implementation is a separate process that is the respon-
sibility of others. A model of law reform that neglects systematic treatment
of implementation and declines accountability in terms of actual results felt
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by people in the real world is a model that requires serious re-thinking. It
may just be that lawyers lack the intellectual tools needed for designing pro-
cess models, so that others with different skills and experience may have to be
called in to assist in this task.
Realistic and responsive priorities cannot be established in isolation
from the major points of contact between the legal order and the people.
Inevitably, the process of reform must plant its feet firmly on the ground
in the community, where all the messy, insoluble problems are found, if it is
ever going to realize its potential. Those who claim the right to set priorities
must go out into the slums, the welfare offices, prisons, criminal court, family
court, small claims court, children's aid societies and elsewhere to experience
how the legal system can be used to subvert community and destroy human
values, and to get a sense of where and how the law might serve to alleviate
and possibly overcome some of these injustices.
This is not to suggest that only the poor or criminals merit attention,
but rather that these tend to be the critical areas where enormous social cost
is being heaped onto the community by our preference for clean, well-defined
problems with technical solutions. In any case, one could hazard a guess that
seventy to eighty percent of the legal resources available in Canada are already
engaged full time in the promotion and protection of the interests of those
who have already achieved a standard of living high enough to support the
highest quality of life imaginable. It is our obsession with standard of living,
with economics, at the expense of concern for quality of life, for a broader
range of values than wealth, that has got us where we are and that deprives
us of the vision to apply our limited reform resources wisely. A sound sense
of priorities can come only from a sound sense of values.
Pressure Points and Timing
Pressure points follow from priorities. If resources are limited, as they
always are, we must use our sense of priorities to identify points in the legal
system where the timely concentration of resources, if sustained, will yield
results. Too often we engage in throwing money at problems, pro rata accord-
ing to pressures of political log-rolling, and excuse failures by stating that the
real problems are beyond our limited reach. We seem to lack the basic
intelligence and will to select objectives and pursue them until we succeed.
Law reform resources, carefully used, could become a kind of "seed
money" or catalytic agent, triggering a much larger reform process that draws
systematically and spontaneously on the vast reservoir of potential that lies
largely dormant in the legal system today. Law reform may be essentially an
educational process, having as its prime objective the release and direction
of human potential.
The selection of pressure points involves nice judgments about the best
people, about timing, and about strategies. Persons capable of making these
judgments well are not common, and in their absence at the helm of the law
reform movement we will have a kind of blind man's bluff in which we will
grope for solutions by pumping massive resources into an indiscriminate,
unidimensional assault on symptoms of problems rather than problems them-
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selves. At enormous cost we will succeed in making the situation a good
deal worse.
We must also remember that 'to every thing there is a season', and in
human affairs there is a rhythm such that the choice of time to apply re-
sources and the coordination of the various elements of the process of reform
belong to the same art as governs the setting of priorities and identification
of pressure points. Like these other aspects it is not something that can be
achieved through organizations and procedures.
Perhaps an example will help. The reform of a particular court could
be attempted through a global study of every aspect of the court, leading to a
definitive report setting out findings and recommendations to be implemented
from the top of the hierarchy down, starting with legislative and executive
action, then implementation through the office of chief judge downward to
the base of the pyramid where ordinary judges, registrars and clerks interact
with citizens. Such an approach would probably fail because it would be in
conflict with the natural dynamics of the processes of the court, especially
with the constantly changing patterns of personnel and their relationships.
A sounder approach, I suggest, is through the appointment of a reform-
minded chief judge with the capacity to lead, who would be in a position to
respond to the natural rhythm of events, establish priorities, identify pres-
sure points, then pursue a manageable and flexible program of initiatives and
interventions, responding to the developing situation within the framework of
that program, supported by the necessary resources to ensure those initiatives
and interventions are pursued until they achieve their minimum objectives.
This approach requires that we organize law reform activities around
key people in the system, bringing to them the information and resources they
need. This, in turn, calls for new conceptions of law reform strategies and
personnel, and the ideas of working groups and field workers will be de-
veloped later for this purpose.
When a person with working experience assesses information or ideas he
does not simply pull related data from pigeon-holes in his mind. Rather, he
runs the material through a complex screening process that draws on the
whole synthesis of his working experience. An experienced judge, legal
counsel or court official is thus able to spot quickly an important operational
factor to which a research worker would have been oblivious even after
exhausting written sources and possibly even after consultation. Only the
direct involvement of experienced people in the reform process can give that
process the benefit of the complex synthesis in that person's mind and enable
it to respond to the dynamics of an ongoing system.
4. Proposals
Reforming the Machinery
It is in the administration of justice that law, lawyers, and legal institu-
tions meld into a working system, and it is here where the center of gravity
of the law reform process ought to be located. However, wise use of limited
resources depends on recognizing that the administration of justice needs
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reform at two levels. The first involves a thorough housecleaning at the
working level, to make the present system function effectively and in ac-
cordance with established principles. The second involves a re-examination
of how the machinery of justice is organized and how it functions, with a
view to introducing changes. Both are essential but each calls for a different
approach. The two cannot be mixed if effective results are to be achieved
at both levels. Only the second level involves reform in the proper sense of
the word, but so accustomed are we to an archaic system of justice that we
tend to think of housecleaning when reform is mentioned. The result is a
confusion of good administration with reform.
Sound administration of the existing system of justice need not and
cannot await studies and reports of the kind that law reform commissions
are geared to produce. It is a matter of proper attention being paid and re-
sources being provided by those who are responsible for the administration
of justice. This means primarily attorneys-general and heads of the various
courts. Conversely, law reform, properly understood, need not await ad-
ministrative housecleaning, but law reform projects relative to the administra-
tion of justice cannot be formulated without some knowledge of the house-
cleaning projects that are currently in progress, being prepared, or being
proposed, including the objects and timetables of those projects. This calls
for continuous consultation between those responsible for the two tasks and
clear definition of the responsibilities of each.
Let us consider fist the housekeeping function. There exist throughout
the system competent and experienced people who know what needs to be
done to improve the system in many ways. In some cases these people have
gathered data and prepared reports on their own initiative, only to find an
absence of response when they have tried to get action. It is futile to engage
another person to duplicate this kind of effort in the name of law reform.
What is needed is greater responsiveness to this kind of initiative so that it
will be encouraged as well as exploited. We are simply failing to use the
built-in capacity for improvement that exists in any organization that con-
tains good people.
In order to tap this potential we must first recognize that the first level
of reform, or what I would call administrative reform, is an integral and
important part of the normal functioning of the system. Time and resources
must be allocated for the purpose, and this is usually possible through picking
up the slack that is bound to exist if the system enjoys good leadership and
healthy morale.
One approach to tapping this source of reform is the working group of
experienced people. Instead of drawing data and experience from the working
level into a research organization such as a law reform commission, this ap-
proach reverses the flow of expertise by injecting into working groups spe-
cialists from government, the practising profession and the academic com-
munity. The effect is dramatic. The dormant energy and enthusiasm of the
best people in the system produces fast, workable results. The depth of
knowledge and range of ideas of the academic is invaluable in providing
alternatives and in expanding thinking. The participation of persons in gov-
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ernment provides direct access to the source of both resources and legislative
and executive action.
It might be useful to consider as a separate function of law reform the
development of specialists who would work with groups of this kind for the
purpose of injecting ideas and providing ready access to the best available
literature on the particular problems being dealt with. The term "resource
person" has been used to describe this kind of function, which might be
systematically developed. The premise underlying this suggestion is that
bibliographies and exhaustive analyses do not meet the needs of those en-
gaged in administrative reform. A written report is a monologue that in-
discriminately treats all aspects of a problem without regard to the priorities
of the working people and the dynamics and timing of the working system.
Written reports we need, but not where other forms of communication and
action are called for. A pooling of all the necessary experience in a working
group may be the most effective approach to administrative reform. There
is really nothing new in this, but the growth of specialized law reform
agencies may lull us into neglect of the housekeeping function, leading to a
misuse of limited and valuable law reform resources for a function they are
not designed to perform. At the same time, we may conclude that law reform
agencies can play a part in the development of some of the resource people
needed for administrative reform.
This leaves for consideration the second level of law reform. Should a
law reform commission spend its time on studies directed at the enactment,
amendment or repeal of legislation or should it probe deeper in search of
the root causes of injustice? The advantages of the former are that the prob-
lems are fairly easily defined and there are established ground-rules for the
process of reform. Really serious issues of philosophy and methodology in
the law do not arise once a decision is made to contain the process of reform
within the established framework of legal thinking. The process is incremental,
and one can expect to double productivity in this kind of reform process by
a simple doubling of resources. This will perhaps satisfy the urge to reform
as long as we do not ask "productivity of what?"
The disadvantage of this approach is that it leaves undisturbed the root
causes of failure and inadequacy. If we are serious about reform, the first
step is to re-educate ourselves in order to escape the orthodoxies of existing
legal thinking and technique. If our problems are rooted in those orthodoxies,
as I suggest some of them are, then we will not even come to grips with them
as long as the process of reform is built on existing thinking and technique.
We may want to come back to use these, but not until we have used more
radical approaches to break out of the closed intellectual world of the con-
ventional legal mind. We all like to believe we are open-minded, but any
lawyer who stands back for a long, hard look at how he functions and who
then considers the conclusions stated by Myrdal in Objectivity in Social
Research7 will begin to doubt his capacity to grasp fresh ideas and ap-
proaches, let alone consider them in an open manner.
7 d.
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Consider, for example, the question of whether the adversary system
should be removed from part or all of the administration of family law. This
may not be the real question; indeed an adversary framework is not in fact
used in family court and in small claims court, in many cases. What we
do not know, and what we have not yet asked, is whether legal minds that
have been shaped around an adversary conception of the law and have
become committed to it can be changed just by altering the rules. This raises
the question of how legal minds are structured and the impact of legal train-
ing and theory on that structure, which in turn leads to a comparison of
the common law mind and method with the civil law mind and method. It
may be that, if the adversary system has proved inappropriate in certain
areas, we need to examine more than just an alternative process. The search
for an alternative may involve a consideration of codes and the mental
formation required to administer them.
I see the question of codification as a key pressure point in the process
of law reform. Many of our problems may flow from the legal theory on
which our legal order is built and from the resulting mental set of lawyers
and judges. A reform process that consists only of revision of areas of sub-
stantive law simply fails to confront these problems.
Changing our Minds
One meaning of the verb "to reform" offered by the Concise Oxford
Dictionary is "to form again", and this is the appropriate sense of the word
when speaking of the reform of lawyers. Civilians often use the word "forma-
tion" when referring to legal education and training, recognizing that there
is involved a process of shaping the intellect in accordance with certain
attitudes and reasoning processes. There is no question that legal education
and training involve a deliberate conditioning of the mind to the discipline
of the law. The best minds come through the process whole, that is, still able
to perceive systems, principles, and relationships between legal and non-legal
phenomena. But too often the price of a legal mind is loss of judgment, loss
of a sense of proportion, and an inability to step back from time to time
from the narrow, technical frame of reference to view the law from the
perspective of the jurist.
Reform of the law and of legal institutions will fail if we do not under-
take simultaneous reform of lawyers. Whether we call it continuing legal
education or something else is unimportant. What is important is that this
activity should provide lawyers with continuing contact with law as an
intellectual discipline, to offset the emphasis on practical results that in-
evitably dominates the lawyer's daily work. Continuing legal education has
not followed this path to date, but has catered to the clearing-house need of
lawyers for help in keeping track of a complex and rapidly changing body
of laws. It has been a technological response to what has been seen as a
quantitative problem. What we need is a balancing thrust towards the
qualitative aspects of the law to provide a basis in the legal mind for in-
creasing simplification and manageability, which, I suggest, are vanishing
features of our legal heritage.
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Equity provides a good illustration of this point. Equity grew out of
the awareness of jurists that justice is what law is about. Law for its own
sake, without regard for its human consequences, was becoming the conceit
of the legal technicians, offering wealth and power without social respon-
sibility, and the jurists developed equity in order to put law back on the track
again. The greatest impact of equity, I suggest, was on the legal mind, where
mathematics and ethical neutrality were forced to yield to art and humanity.
Somehow the legal technicians have once again managed to restore the
primacy of mathematics in much of legal process, aided by specialization and
a naive faith in the power of legislation.
The reform of lawyers simply involves increasing their capacity to think
in terms of principles and to make difficult judgments in terms of human
consequences when choosing or advocating alternative legal outcomes. The
Canadian Bill of Rights offered a clear and authoritative basis for a new
equity in Canadian law but it has failed for want of the kind of intellectual
formation necessary to weave its broad statements of values and principles
into the positive law. There is little use in enacting more laws of this kind
until the necessary intellectual foundation for their realization has been laid
in the legal mind.
That judges and lawyers already have this formation to some degree
is evidenced by the fact that equity still lives. Judges in Quebec continue to
work with the broad formulations of a civil code. Yet what seems to have
happened in Canada is that the theory of positive law has been taken literally
as a description of legal process, resulting in the professional myth of a
science of law that is value-free and purely objective. Legal process, when
approached through this frame of reference, is reduced to an exercise in
logic. Mathematics and ethical neutrality have resumed their primacy.
Codification may be a key to the future of Canadian law. The codifica-
tion movement in the United States may have failed because the American
legal mind cannot accommodate the processes of a code. If it is becoming
apparent that fewer and simpler laws are required, this is the time to begin
laying the foundation through that process of formation called legal educa-
tion, whether initial or continuing.
We often speak of changing our minds. The French equivalent, "change
d'idde"' is more accurate, and in a revealing way. To change one's opinion
is easy. To change one's mind in the sense of altering the structure to achieve
a different "formation" is much more difficult and time-consuming. If the
initial "formation" requires three years of law school, then the reform of
lawyers may be a major undertaking whose desirability and feasibility we
ought to be studying carefully right now.
The point being made here is basic and important. Laws are expressed
in words, but the words are translated into action and reality only after they
are processed through legal minds. If on examination of the reality around
us we find disparities between that reality and the values that motivated the
words that express our laws, then our problem may lie in part in the
mechanism we call the legal mind. We may have to change our minds.
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